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1 Introduction 
This paper addresses a specific problem of the economic evaluation of public projects. 
The economic theory of value is based on individual preferences. There is little 
discussion, however, about which entities are appropriate objects of preferences. While 
it is straightforward to define the domain of preferences in some applications of 
economic valuation, it is a sensitive issue in others. In the theory of consumer choice, 
for instance, bundles of private market goods constitute a suitable domain of 
preferences. However, it is not at all clear what should be in the domain of individual 
preferences when economic theory of value is applied to public projects. The debatable 
objects are the well-being of other individuals (usually termed "altruism") and the 
existence of entities such as, for example, an animal species, a natural monument or a 
work of art. This paper proves that a common notion of existence value, the value of 
mere existence, is inconsistent with generally acknowledged principles in economic 
methodology and economics. Moreover, it is argued that a particular type of altruism 
which gives rise to the so-called bequest value may cause a severely biased valuation. 
Hence, bequest value should be excluded from economic evaluation of public projects. 
My conclusions are in sharp contrast with many studies primarily in the field of 
environmental valuation which have been conducted to measure so-called existence and 
bequest values.1 I claim that any attempt to measure existence value is flawed, and the 
measurement of bequest values is at best in vain, but more likely seriously misleading. 
As there is no standard terminology in the literature, the paper attempts to set the 
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terminology straight. However, the main claims of the paper are not merely 
terminological. The claim here is that the category of non-use values should be ignored 
in public decision-making. Instead, the aim of valuation studies should shift to give a 
full account of the use values of all present and future individuals, be they human or 
non-human. 
"Existence value" has been used in different meanings. Since terminology seems to 
have led to confusion, the following section briefly reviews the literature on non-use 
values. Sections 3 and 4 are the core of the paper. Section 3 provides precise definitions 
of the relevant concepts and it presents the proof that existence value is incompatible 
with four basic principles of economic valuation. Section 4 states an impartiality 
condition and shows that bequest values violate this condition. The concluding section 5 
summarises the results and explores their implications. It is argued that non-use values 
should not be used to evaluate public projects and an alternative valuation framework is 
suggested. 
2 A brief review of non-use values in the literature 
Traditional welfare theory suggests that – in the absence of externalities – a national 
park that cannot be maintained by collecting user fees should be closed down. Weisbrod 
(1964) has challenged this view. The fees collected may underestimate the true value of 
the park. Weisbrod's main argument is that there are people who anticipate visiting the 
park in the future, but in fact they never do. The option to use a good does not result in a 
market transaction, although it is valuable. Hence, according to Weisbrod, traditional 
welfare measures underestimate the value of such good. 
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Krutilla (1967) in an attempt to extend Weisbrod's argument has introduced existence 
and bequest motives into the discussion. According to Krutilla (1967, 781), 
"there are many persons who obtain satisfaction from mere knowledge that 
part of wilderness North America remains even though they would be 
appalled by the prospect of being exposed to it." 
Like option value, a value attached to the existence of, say, a species or a wilderness 
area would not show up in a welfare measure based on market transactions. In addition, 
Krutilla (1967, 784) points out that bequest motives are insufficiently represented in 
decisions on nature conservation because of their public goods characteristics.  
In the literature on environmental valuation it is common to distinguish use values and 
non-use values of a good.2 Unfortunately, the distinction is made in different ways. 
Since option value, existence value and bequest value do not immediately lead to 
market transactions, they have been termed "non-use values" (e.g. Hanley and Spash 
1993, 65-66). Sometimes, the term "passive use value" is also used (e.g. Bjornstad and 
Kahn 1996). However, because a good's option value is clearly connected to its 
potential use, the option value may be classified as use value (e.g. Randall and Stoll 
1983 or Kolstad 2000, 295-96). In the following I will adopt this terminology. All 
values fall into two broad categories: use value and non-use value. 
The use value of a good is the value attached to the current, future, or potential use of 
the good. The use of the good can be direct, for example, the consumption of an apple, 
or indirect, for example, the oxygen production of a forest. A distinction between 
consumptive use, for example, hunting, and non-consumptive use, for example, bird 
watching, has also been drawn (e.g. Boyle and Bishop 1987). The value of the potential 
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use of a good is its option value and its quasi-option value. The option value of a good 
is the value of keeping the option to use the good. It can be interpreted as the value of 
insurance if future needs and circumstances are not yet known. The quasi-option value 
of a good is essentially the value of future information which improves the basis of 
decision-making concerning the use of the good.3 
The non-use value is attached to a good independent of its use. Non-use values fall into 
two categories, existence value and bequest value.4 
There are several meanings of "existence value" in the literature. Some authors use 
"existence value" for what is named "non-use value" here (e.g. Randall and Stoll 1983, 
Pearce and Turner 1990, 134, McConnell 1997 or Perman et al. 1999, 378). Pearce and 
Turner (1990, 135) hold the view that all existence value stems from different forms of 
altruism. According to Turner (1999, 24) existence value is a special form of altruism. 
Some authors' definitions of existence value are vague and they do not commit to a 
view on whether all existence value stems from altruism or not (e.g. Perman et al. 1999, 
378). An explicit distinction between existence value and bequest value (altruism) is 
drawn, for example, by Lazo et al. (1997, 359) and Kolstad (2000, 296).5 Loomis 
(1988) introduces a utility function relating an individual's utility to the use of a natural 
resource and the knowledge that the resource exists. The value of the knowledge of the 
existence of the resource is, in turn, related others' use of the resource and their 
knowledge about its existence. Similarly, Bishop (1978) attributes existence value to the 
knowledge that something exists. Bishop and Welsh (1992) link existence value to 
"altruism towards animals and feelings of environmental responsibility". Hanley et al. 
(1997, 373) define: "Existence value is the value of mere existence of a resource, given 
that the individual has no plans ever to use it." 
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Broadly speaking, there seem to be two views on the nature of non-use values. 
According to the first view, all non-use values arise from some form of altruism, be it 
altruism towards current or future, human or non-human individuals. According to the 
second view, there also exists an existence value which is independent of altruistic 
motives. Existence value is the value attached to the existence of a good independently 
of use of the good and independently of any altruistic motives. As use and altruism are 
ruled out, two motives remain for a positive existence value, the knowledge that 
something exists and mere existence. The value of mere existence has been called 
intrinsic value and is supposed to reflect a moral view that certain goods, like, for 
example, the spotted owl or the Niagara Falls, have a right to exist.  
In section 3, I take issue with the view that the knowledge of the existence of a good is a 
reasonable object of preference. Furthermore, I show that a value of mere existence is 
incompatible with fundamental economic and methodological assumptions. A rational 
individual cannot have a preference for the mere existence of a good (unless rather 
strong metaphysical assumptions are adopted). 
If existence value is not a proper value category, it follows that all non-use value stems 
from altruism – what remains of the category of non-use values then is bequest value. 
There are different forms of altruism. Sen (1977, 92) distinguishes sympathy and 
commitment. "If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of 
sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong 
and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment." Randall and 
Stoll (1983, 267) introduce the same distinction but use a different terminology. They 
note that vicarious consumption (sympathy) is a use value and they reserve the term 
"altruism" (commitment) for non-use values. The terminology that I adopt in the 
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remainder of this paper is as follows: Bequest value is a non-use values that stems from 
altruism, where altruism means committment, not sympathy.  
In section 4, I argue that the use of bequest values in economic valuation violates an 
impartiality condition. Hence, bequest values should be excluded from the evaluation of 
public projects. My argument is in line with but goes beyond Milgrom's (1993) claim 
that altruistic motives lead to double counting in willingness-to-pay studies.6 
3 Why existence values should not be used 
Conceptual problems of "existence value" have been noticed before. Aldred (1994) 
reviews different conceptions of existence value and their respective difficulties. He 
claims that these difficulties can be overcome by placing existence value in the wedge 
between individual welfare and individual choice. In Aldred's conception the existence 
value is essentially an altruistic value. Rosenthal and Nelson (1992) also notice the 
conceptual weakness of "existence value" by pointing out that everything can have 
existence value. Their examples include: "1968 Ford Mustangs, the performance of the 
U.S. defense forces following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, coal mining jobs in West 
Virginia, ..., or jobs anywhere" (Rosenthal and Nelson 1992, 118). They notice that 
there is no way to stop and conclude that the existence value should not be used in cost-
benefit analysis. But they do not go further to a logical analysis of the concept. This gap 
is filled in the remainder of this section. 
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I will first discuss and reject the view that knowledge of the existence of a good matters. 
Then, I will show that the mere existence of a good cannot be a proper object of a 
preference. 
Knowing that something exists can be very valuable. Knowing that grizzly bears exist 
in a national park can save your life when you go hiking. Knowing that the blue whale 
exists may trigger the wish to see one. Knowledge in such cases is connected to 
(positive or negative) use values. Knowledge or, more generally, information is a key 
element in decision-making. Additional information can improve decisions in the sense 
that the best action has a higher expected value if new information is expected to arrive, 
than the best action without further information. The value of information, the (partial) 
removal of uncertainties, gives rise to a quasi-option value.7 However, existence value 
as the value of the knowledge that a good exists is distinct from the value of information 
to upgrade decision-making. Krutilla (1967) does not refer to any informational value. 
Also Loomis's (1988) formal account of existence value makes no reference to the role 
of information in decision-making. Hence, I will rule out the interpretation that 
existence value is in fact a disguised quasi-option value.  
But if existence value is independent of the value of information, then existence value 
as the value of the knowledge that x exists is categorically flawed. It fails to distinguish 
the value of an object and the ability to value the object. Suppose x is a bird and x is 
unknown to me. Hence, under the 'knowledge definition', it cannot have existence value. 
As I get to know that x exists, I will attach existence value to it. This makes existence 
value sensitive to the state of my knowledge. Suppose I built my house on the last 
habitat of x and x is unknown to me. Suppose, furthermore, that x is extinguished 
through my act. Given my ignorance, my valuation and my choice were right if it is 
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knowledge that causes existence value. This seems to be implausible. Ignorance may 
save me from moral blame, but it does not make my choice the right choice. Therefore, 
we cannot accept the view that existence value depends on the knowledge that 
something exists.8 Note also that this view is troublesome for empirical valuation 
studies using the contingent valuation method. In such studies people are usually 
informed about the good to be valued. Hence, on the 'knowledge definition' of existence 
value, contingent valuation would create the values it wants to measure.9 
As the 'knowledge definition' must be rejected, it remains to be shown that existence 
value as the value of mere existence is incompatible with generally acknowledged 
principles in economics and economic methodology.  
I will use the following definitions of the value concepts under debate which have been 
adapted from the literature.10 
DEFINITION: Use value is the value of a good's current, future or potential use. 
DEFINITION: Non-use value is the value of a good that is independent of its 
current, future or potential use. 
In order to draw a clear terminological distinction between use values and non-use 
values I will say that individual i's use of a (valuable) good x increases i's well-being or 
makes i better off. And, if i is better off in the presence of x than without x, then i is 
using x. Value is reflected in i's preferences which are defined over the set of all 
possible states of the world. Suppose i's well-being is the same in two states s and s', 
still i may prefer s to s', since i may be motivated by other concerns than her own well-
being. 
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We can now examine whether the mere existence of a good may be such other concern. 
Existence value is defined as follows: 
DEFINITION: Existence value is the value of the existence of a good 
independently of any value associated with its use and independently of 
altruistic motives.  
The following principles are adopted. 
MI  Methodological Individualism  All value is value for an individual.  
OR  Ockam's Razor  The existence of an entity should not be admitted, if it 
can be avoided without loss. 
VP  Value as Preference Satisfaction  For any two situations s and s', where a 
good x is present in s but not present in s' while s and s' are equal otherwise, a 
good x is valuable for an individual i in situation s if and only if i prefers 
situation s to situation s'.11 
IG  Individual Good  For all individuals i, i cannot strictly prefer situation s to 
situation s' if there is no individual for whom situation s is strictly better than 
situation s'.  
MI as stated above is the normative variant of the epistemological principle that "social 
phenomena can only be properly explained in individual terms" (Tännsjö 1990, 70). In 
the context of a theory of valuation (the purpose of which is not explanation but 
prescription, i.e. to identify best actions), the principle requires that social values – the 
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social evaluation of (environmental) goods or projects – are fully determined on the 
bases of individual values. MI is generally acknowledged in economics. This is clearly 
reflected in the way social welfare functions are constructed (cf. Bergson 1938; Arrow 
1951). MI rules out that a good has value independently of the existence of an 
individual for whom the good is valuable. 
OR is also a widely acknowledged methodological principle. OR states that one must 
not postulate the existence of an entity unless it is necessary for a consistent description 
and understanding of observed phenomena (Dancy 1985, 148). OR rules out, for 
example, the existence of a substance that has no causal connection to our universe. For 
an entity to exist there must be, at least in principle, a way of knowing that it exists. In 
the context of a theory of value OR rules out the existence of values which will under 
no condition influence the behaviour or well-being of the individual holding the value. 
That a good has value for some individual implies that there are, at least in principle, 
observable consequences. 
VP phrases the economists' conception of the value of a good in the most general way. 
Note that it is not required for a good to have value that an individual consumes the 
good or that the good makes the individual better off. The premise of value as 
preference does not exclude the possibility of an existence value.  
IG is a version of the person-affecting principle (Parfit 1984). It is motivated by the 
same intuition as the Pareto principle, which states that a situation s is better than a 
situation s' if s is better for someone and not worse for anyone. It is also similar to 
Broome's (1991) principle of personal good. However, there are two differences. First, I 
do not require that individual valuers are persons. We can say that a situation is better 
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for an individual who is not a person, but, say, a blue whale. Second, IG imposes a 
constraint on individual valuation (or preferences) rather than on social evaluation. IG 
allows for altruism, but it requires choosing according to one's own good when others' 
well-being is not affected.  
The following proposition holds: 
PROPOSITION 1: No good has existence value under any valuation satisfying 
principles MI, OR, VP, and IG. 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. We assume that a good has a (positive) existence 
value under some valuation and show that this violates at least one of the principles MI, 
OR, VP, and IG. 
According to MI the only way a good x can have an existence value is that some 
individual i places value on x. We assume that i is the only individual who places value 
on x. Furthermore we assume that i does not attach value to any current, future or 
potential use of x. We are justified to assume this, because existence value is by 
definition independent of any use of the good. We also assume that i has no altruistic 
motives. This assumption is warranted, because existence value is assumed to be 
distinct from bequest value.  
Consider two situations sx and s0, where x is present in sx, but not present in s0, all other 
features of the two situations being the same. Since x has no use value for i, i is not 
better nor worse off in situation sx than in situation s0. i is not affected by x at all or i is 
affected in a way that does not change i's well-being. (If x would cause a pleasant 
feeling or contribute to i's well-being, x would have use value.)  
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Assuming that i places existence value on x, by VP, i has a preference for sx over s0. By 
OR the fact that i places existence value on x must have some observable impact. 
Consider a situation sx' which is the similar to sx in all respects, but i's well-being is 
slightly reduced. This reduction of well-being can be arbitrarily small. Suppose now i is 
given the choice between s0 and sx'. For a sufficiently small reduction of i's well-being 
and a positive existence value OR requires that i chooses sx'. If i were not willing to 
give up some arbitrarily small amount of well-being for the existence of x, there would 
be no observable impact of holding that value. However, the choice sx' out of {s0, sx'} 
violates IG. It makes i worse off without making anyone better off, since, by 
assumption, i is the only individual who places value on x. Hence, MI, OR, VP, IG and 
a positive existence value are mutually inconsistent. QED. 
To exemplify the argument, suppose Eve values the existence of the Maltese Falcon, 
but the Maltese Falcon does not affect any feature of the world that affects Eve's well-
being. If she would enjoy watching the Maltese Falcon or if the Maltese Falcon would 
potentially contribute in any other way to make Eve's life better, the Maltese Falcon 
would have a use value for Eve. Let us assume it has not. Suppose, furthermore, that 
Eve is unconcerned about other individuals or all other individuals are unconcerned 
about the Maltese Falcon; then the Maltese Falcon does not have a bequest value for 
Eve. That Eve attaches an existence value to the Maltese Falcon means that Eve is 
willing to make at least a small sacrifice to protect its existence. Since the Maltese 
Falcon does not affect any feature of the world that makes someone's life better, Eve 
would be worse off making such sacrifice without anyone else being better off. 
Moreover, since the Maltese Falcon does not affect any feature of the world that Eve 
cares about it could have any arbitrary set of features. The existence value, then, is a 
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value that is attached to nothing particular. It does not distinguish whether the Maltese 
Falcon is a living bird, a small statue, a strip of celluloid, or an image on a movie 
screen. A thing without recognisable features cannot be said to exist and it cannot have 
value. Ockam's razor cuts off a value that applies to everything regardless of its 
features; just as it cuts off a proclaimed value for which one is not prepared to move a 
finger. 
4 Why bequest values should not be used 
In the preceding section I have shown that existence values should not be used for the 
evaluation of a public project. The remaining type of non-use value is bequest value. In 
this section I argue that the use of bequest values may lead to biased judgement and 
should not be used in economic valuation of public projects. 
It is useful to start with a definition: 
DEFINITION: Bequest value is a non-use value that arises from altruism. 
As there are different notions of altruism we have to introduce two distinctions.12 
First, notice that altruism may give rise to use values as well as non-use values. 
Individual i holds an altruistic use value if i is made better off by an improvement of 
someone else's well-being. On the other hand, altruistic non-use values (bequest values) 
do not make i better nor worse off. Similarly, Randall and Stoll (1983) classify 
vicarious consumption as use value and distinguish three types of altruistic non-use 
values of a good Q: (i) interpersonal altruism if Q is available for contemporaries, (ii) 
intergenerational altruism if Q is available for future generations, and (iii) Q-altruism if 
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"Q itself is benefiting from being undisturbed." Let us adopt a conception of altruism 
that comprises committment towards (i) current persons, (ii) future persons and (iii) 
other individuals.13 The important issue is rather whether and how bequest values 
(altruistic non-use values) should be accounted for in public decision-making. 
To explore this, a second distinction between non-paternalistic and paternalistic 
altruism is important. Bergstrom (1982) distinguishes a case of pure benevolence where 
an individual values someone else's well-being (non-paternalism) from a case where an 
individual values someone else's consumption of a merit good (paternalism).14 He 
shows that any allocation that is Pareto optimal under non-paternalistic altruism is also 
Pareto optimal under selfish preferences. Hence, a project can be evaluated using selfish 
preferences. If a project would not be selected under selfish preferences, it would not be 
selected under non-paternalistic altruism. Why this is the case can best be demonstrated 
by means of an example. 
Suppose a project gives a benefit b to n people and the total net benefit nb does not 
cover the cost of the project c. As nb < c the project would not be selected under selfish 
preferences. Could the existence of non-paternalistic altruism change it into a good 
project? The answer is 'no'. Suppose beneficiaries share the cost equally. As b < c/n they 
would be worse off with the project. A non-paternalistic altruist would not want to 
adopt such project. Suppose next, the altruist covers the cost. Now beneficiaries are 
better off and the altruist appreciates this. Still the project is not worth while. The non-
paternalistic altruist could transfer a compensation c/n to each beneficiary instead of 
adopting the project. As c/n > b the compensation payment makes beneficiaries better 
off than the project and, hence, is preferred by the altruist.  
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There are two limitations to Bergstrom's result. First, as shown by Flores (2002), it 
cannot be extrapolated to serve the purpose of cost-benefit analysis. Second, 
Bergstrom's analysis uses an ordinal framework to identify Pareto optimal allocations. 
An ordinal framework, however, is not suitable to consider distributional concerns. In 
welfare analysis with altruistic agents distributional concerns have first been raised by 
Johannson (1992, 611) and Diamond and Hausman (1994, 55), but they have not been 
explored in detail. Milgrom (1993) has argued that altruism leads to double counting. 
But his argument only addresses the issue of allocative efficiency.15 In the remainder of 
this section I discuss distributional aspects of altruistic valuation and show how non-
paternalistic altruism and paternalistic altruism violate an impartiality condition. 
Impartially requires that the evaluation of an economic project gives equal weight to the 
well-being of each individual. This principle can be phrased as follows: 
EC  Equal Consideration of Individual Good  Each individual's well-being 
receives the same weight.  
EC can be interpreted as an anonymity condition which is widely used in social choice 
theory (e.g. Sen 1970, 68). Decision-making on public projects should be neutral with 
regard to the identity of individuals who benefit or suffer from a project. 
To state the next proposition we distinguish universal non-paternalistic altruism from 
limited altruism. An universal non-paternalistic altruist gives the same weight to the 
well-being of each individual while a limited altruist does not. The following 
propositions holds: 
PROPOSITION 2: (a) If bequest values are based on limited altruism, accounting 
for bequest values is incompatible with EC. 
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(b) If bequest values are based on universal altruism, accounting for bequest 
values is redundant. 
Proof: To prove part (a) of the proposition it is sufficient to construct an example where 
the use of the bequest value leads to a bias. 
First, consider the case of non-paternalistic altruism. Suppose, there is a society of n 
individuals. The preferences of all individuals i are represented by a value function vi 
that depends on individual well-being (w1, ..., wn).16 Suppose, furthermore, individual k, 
the king, say, is selfish, i.e. he cares only about his own well-being: vk = wk. All other 
individuals care about their own and the king's well-being: vi = wi + wk for all i other 
than k. Consider two competing projects A and B. A is a project that gives one additional 
unit of well-being to everyone but the king. B is a project the gives one additional unit 
of well-being to the king. Hence project A generates n – 1 units of value and project B 
generates n units of value. Clearly, the choice of B instead of A violates EC. Similar 
cases can be constructed for the case of paternalistic altruism, where j's consumption is 
an argument in i's value function. 
To prove part (b) of the proposition we have to show that the selection of a project is 
independent of bequest values based on universal non-paternalistic altruism. 
Suppose a project A generates the highest use value (well-being) of all available 
projects and the selection of A satisfies EC. By definition an universal non-paternalistic 
altruist will prefer the same project. The consideration of universal non-paternalistic 
altruism will not change the ranking of projects and is, thus, redundant. QED. 
The inclusion of bequest values in economic valuation will either be redundant or lead 
to an absurd discrepancy between economic valuation and the concern for individual 
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well-being. Moreover economic valuation would be highly sensitive with regard to 
existence and structure of altruism in society.  
To be sure, this does not deny the existence and importance of altruism. Rather, the 
argument implies that altruistic non-use values (bequest values) should not be used to 
evaluate public projects. The argument does not rule out that a kidney should be 
allocated to a young mother whose children enjoy their mother to be alive and happy, 
rather than to a person with no relatives. But a full discussion of these issues goes 
beyond the scope of the current paper.  
Finally, note that under a hedonistic interpretation of preference satisfaction as 
happiness, if i has altruistic motives towards j, then j's happiness contributes to i's 
happiness and is a use value for i. In such a framework there is no room for non-use 
values anyway. However, the arguments in this paper bear no commitment to such a 
view. 
5 Conclusions for a valuation framework  
In this paper I have traced the conceptual difficulties of "existence value" to their 
logical roots. Any attempt to measure existence value must invoke strong metaphysical 
assumptions which violate at least one of the principles of Methodological 
Individualism, Ockam's Razor, Value as Preference Satisfaction or Individual Good. 
Furthermore, I show that the use of bequest values in economic evaluations of public 
projects may lead to severely biased judgements – a violation of the principle of Equal 
Consideration of Individual Good. Since existence value and bequest value exhaust the 
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category of non-use values, I conclude that the attempt to measure non-use values is in 
vain or even misleading. 
In contrast to my claims, non-use values have made their way from theoretical 
discussion to empirical investigations. How can existence value be inconsistent with 
basic economic and methodological principles when it has been quantified in many 
studies?17 The answer lies in the problems of the contingent valuation method which is 
used for the measurement of non-use values.18 Cummings and Harrison (1995) review a 
number of studies on the measurement of non-use values. They conclude that there is no 
operationally meaningful way to decompose use values and non-use values. Kahneman 
and Knetsch (1992), Diamond and Hausman (1993, 1994), Diamond (1996), and Fisher 
(1996) have criticised the contingent valuation method because it does not assess the 
preferences it is meant to assess.  
The claim of this paper is that non-use values should not be used to evaluate public 
projects or policies. This has significant consequences for empirical valuation studies. 
In particular contingent valuation studies should not try to assess the willingness to pay 
for moral attitudes. Instead of trying to assess individuals' willingness to pay for 
existence and bequest, the task is rather an assessment of all current and future, actual 
and potential use values of all (human and non-human) individuals holding values. Such 
a research programme has a clear conceptual basis.  
One might be worried that the rejection of non-use types of altruism, i.e. bequest value, 
will lead to a neglect of important concerns for future generations and non-human 
individuals. But this is not so. I believe the motivation to measure bequest value is fully 
acknowledged if all use values are counted. 
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First, notice that all bequest value originates from use value. The argument for this is 
straightforward. Suppose there is a queue of all individuals with preferences. Suppose 
individual 1 places no use value on a good x; but she places a bequest value on x 
because individual 2 values the good. We have to consider 2's motives. If 2 attaches use 
value to x, the argument is complete. If 2 values x for its bequest value, that is, because 
3 values x, we consider 3's motives. And so on. If a good has no actual or potential use 
for some individual now or in the future, then it does not have a bequest value. 
Ultimately bequest value must be based on a use value for someone. The principle of 
the individual good introduced in section 3 does not permit infinite chains of bequest 
values that do not ultimately lead to some use value. 
Second, to count the (potential) use value for future individuals of, say, a species which 
has been protected, is a more direct (and less biased) procedure than to enquire about 
current individuals attitudes toward the future. Consider the evaluation of a project to 
protect the blue whale. Suppose the project would ensure the survival of a certain 
population of blue whales. A conventional study would try to assess the willingness to 
pay of the current (human) population for such project. The concern of future 
generations would be captured via the bequest value and to the extent that altruism 
towards future individuals prevails. The bequest value also captures altruism towards 
the blue whale. But notice that a contingent valuation study captures the concern of the 
blue whale, presumably a being with interests, only conditional on and to the extent that 
altruism prevails in the current human population. By contrast, a full evaluation of the 
project based on use values would try to assess the effects of the project (that a 
population of blue whales survives) on the well-being of current and future humans, 
whales and other individuals with interests. 
 21 
References 
Ahlheim, Michael / Schneider, Jürgen (1996) Altruismus und die Bewertung öffentlicher Güter. Ein 
Beitrag zur Kontroverse um die Kontingente Evaluierungsmethode. Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik 215, 598-611. 
Aldred, Jonathan (1994) Existence Value, Welfare and Altruism. Environmental Values 3, 381-402. 
Andreoni, James (1990) Impure Altruism and Donations to Public-Goods. A Theory of Warm Glow 
Giving. Economic Journal 100, 464-477. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values. Second edition 1963. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. / Fisher, Anthony C. (1974) Environmental preservation, uncertainty and 
irreversibility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, 312-319. 
Bergson, Abram (1938) A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 52, 310-334. 
Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1982) When is a Man's Life Worth More than His Human Capital? In: Jones-
Lee (ed., 1982) The Value of Life and Safety: Proceedings of a Conference Held by the Geneva 
Association. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Bishop, Richard C. (1978) Endangered Species and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum 
Standard. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60, 10-18. 
Bishop, Richard C. / Welsh, Michael P. (1992) Existence Values In Benefit-Cost Analysis and Damage 
Assessment. Land Economics 68(4), 405-417. 
Bishop, Richard C. / Woodward, Richard T. (1995) Valuation of Environmental Quality under Certainty. 
In: Bromley, Daniel W. (ed., 1995) The Handbook of Environmental Economics. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 543-567. 
Bjornstad, David J. / Kahn, James R. (1996) Characteristics of Environmental Resources and Their 
Relevance for Measuring Value. In: Bjornstad, David J. / Kahn, James R. (eds., 1996) The 
Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 3-15. 
Bowker, J.M. / Stoll, John R. (1988) Use of dichotomous choice nonmarket methods to value the 
whooping crane resource. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70, 372-381. 
Boyle, Kevin J. / Bishop, Richard C. (1987) Valuing Wildlife in Benefit-Cost Analyses: A Case Study 
Involving Endangered Species. Water Resources Research 23(5), 943-950. 
Brookshire, David S. / Eubanks, Larry S. / Randall, Alan (1983) Estimating Option Prices and Existence 
Values for Wildlife Resources. Land Economics 59, 1-15. 
Broome, John (1991) Weighing Goods. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Brouwer, Roy / Slangen, Louis H.G. (1998) Contingent valuation of the public benefits of agricultural 
wildlife management: The case of Dutch peat meadow land. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 25, 53-72. 
Carson, Richard T. / Flores, Nicholas E. / Meade, Norman F. (2001) Contingent Valuation: Controversies 
and Evidence. Environmental and resource Economics 19, 173-210. 
Cummings, Ronald G. / Harrison, Glenn W. (1995) The Measurement and Decomposition of Nonuse 
Values: Critical Review. Environmental and Resource Economics 5, 225-247. 
Dancy, Jonathan (1985) Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Diamond, Peter (1996) Discussion of the Conceptual Underpinnings of the Contingent Valuation Method 
by A.C. Fisher. In: Bjornstad, David J./Kahn, James R. (eds., 1996) The Contingent Valuation of 
Environmental Resources. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 61-71. 
 22 
Diamond, Peter A. / Hausman, Jerry A. (1993) On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse 
Values. In: Hausman, J.A. (Ed., 1993) Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland. 3-38. 
Diamond, Peter A. / Hausman, Jerry A. (1994) Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No 
Number? Journal of Economic Perspectives 8(4), 45-64. 
Field, Barry C. (1997) Environmental Economics. An Introduction. Second edition, New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Fisher, Anthony C. (1996) The Conceptual Underpinnings of the Contingent Valuation Method. In: 
Bjornstad, David J./Kahn, James R. (eds., 1996) The Contingent Valuation of Environmental 
Resources. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 19-37. 
Flores, Nicholas E. (2002) Non-paternalistic altruism and welfare economics. Journal of Public 
Economics 83, 293-305. 
Hanley, Nick / Shogren, Jason F. / White, Ben (1997) Environmental Economics in Theory and Practice. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Hanley, Nick / Shogren, Jason F. / White, Ben (2001) Introduction to Environmental Economics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hanley, Nick / Spash, Clive L. (1993) Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment. Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar. 
Henry, Claude (1974) Option Values in the Economics of Irreplaceable Assets. Review of Economic 
Studies 41 (Symposium), 89-104. 
Johansson, Per-Olov (1992) Altruism in Cost-Benefit Analysis. Environmental and Resource Economics 
2, 605-613. 
Johansson, Per-Olov (1993) Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jones-Lee, Michael W. (1992) Paternalistic Altruism and the Value of Statistical Life. Economic Journal 
102, 80-90. 
Kahneman, Daniel / Knetsch, Jack L. (1992) Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22, 57-70. 
Kolstad, Charles D. (2000) Environmental Economics. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Kotchen, Matthew J. / Reiling, Stephen D. (2000) Environmental attitudes, motivations, and contingent 
valuation of nonuse values: a case study involving endangered species. Ecological Economics 
32(1), 93-107. 
Krutilla, John (1967) Conservation Reconsidered. American Economic Review 57, 777-786. 
Lazo, Jeffrey-K. / McClelland, Gary H. / Schulze,William D. (1997) Economic Theory and Psychology 
of Non-use Values. Land-Economics 73(3): 358-71. 
Loomis, John B. (1988) Broadening the Concept and Measurement of Existence Value. Northeastern 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 17(1), 23-29. 
Loomis, John B. / White, Douglas S. (1996) Economic benefits of rare and endangered species: summary 
and meta analysis. Ecological Economics 18, 197-206. 
Madriaga, Bruce / McConnell, Kenneth E. (1987) Exploring Existence Value. Water resources Research 
23, 936-942. 
McConnell, Kenneth E. (1997) Does Altruism Undermine Existence Value? Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 32, 22-37. 
 23 
Milgrom, Paul (1993) Is Sympathy an Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent 
Valuation Method. In: Hausman, J.A. (Ed., 1993) Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 417-441. 
Parfit, Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons. Reprint with Corrections. Oxford 1989: Clarendon Press. 
Pearce, David W. / Turner, R. Kerry (1990) Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Perman, Roger / Ma, Yue / McGilvray, James / Common, Michael (1999) Natural Resource and 
Environmental Economics. Second edition, London: Longman. 
Randall, Alan / Stoll, John R. (1983) Existence Value in a Total Valuation Framework. In: Rowe, R.D. / 
Chestnut, L.G. (eds.) Managing air quality and visual resources at national parks and wilderness 
areas. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 265-274. 
Ready, Richard C. (1995) Environmental Valuation under Uncertainty. In: Bromley, Daniel W. (ed., 
1995) The Handbook of Environmental Economics. Oxford: Blackwell. 568-593. 
Rosenthal, Donald H. / Nelson, Robert H. (1992) Why Existence Value Should Not Be Used in Cost-
Benefit Analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 11(1), 116-122. 
Schulze, William D. / Brookshire, David S. / Walther, Eric G. / MacFarland, Karen Kelley / Thayer, 
Mark A. / Whitworth, Regan L. / Ben-David, Shaul / Malm, William / Molenar, John (1983) The 
Economic Benefits of Preserving Visibility in the National Parklands of the Southwest. Natural 
Resources Journal 23, 149-173. 
Sen, Amartya (1977) Rational Fools. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, 317-344. 
Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden Day. 
Silberman, Jonathan / Gerlowski, Daniel A. / Williams, Nancy A. (1992) Estimating Existence Value for 
Users and Nonusers of New Jersey Beaches. Land Economics 68(2), 225-236. 
Stevens, Thomas H. / Echeverria, Jaime / Glass, Ronald J. / Hager, Tim / More, Thomas A. (1991) 
Measuring the Existence Value of Wildlife: What Do CVM Estimates Really Show? Land 
Economics 67(4), 390-400. 
Tännsjö, Torbjörn (1990) Methodological Individualism. Inquiry 33, 69-80. 
Turner, R. Kerry (1999) The Place of Economic Values in Environmental Valuation. In: Bateman, Ian 
J./Willis, Kenneth G. (eds., 1999) Valuing Environmental Preferences. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Weisbrod, Burton A. (1964) Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-Consumption Goods. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 78, 471-478. 
                                                 
1
 For example, the studies by Brookshire et al. (1983), Schulze et al. (1983), Boyle and Bishop 
(1987), Madriaga and McConnell (1987), Bowker and Stoll (1988), Loomis (1988), Stevens et al. (1991), 
Silberman et al. (1992), Brouwer and Slangen (1998) and Kotchen and Reiling (2000); see also Loomis 
and White (1996) for an overview of studies. 
2
 The distinction has made its way into most text book chapters on environmental valuation; see 
e.g. Field (1997), Perman et al. (1999), Kolstad (2000), or Hanley et al. (2001). 
3
 See Bishop and Woodward (1995) and Ready (1995) for detailed surveys of option value and 
quasi-option value, respectively. The option value concept has been introduced by Weisbrod (1964). 
Quasi-option value was first discussed by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974). 
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4
 This terminology is also broadly in line with, for example, Turner (1999, 20-21) and Kolstad 
(2000, 296). 
5
 The distinction is made implicitly in Randall and Stoll (1983) if their concept of Q-altruism is 
applied to natural monuments such as the Grand Canyon. For such cases, Q-altruism is a misnomer; see 
section 4. Aldred (1994) provides a detailed discussion of terminology and concepts. Pearce and Turner 
(1990, 134; emphasis P. & T.) define: "Existence value is a value placed on an environmental good and 
which is unrelated to any actual or potential use of the good." Perman et al. (1999, 378) state: "Existence 
value arises from the knowledge that the service exists and will continue to exist, independently of any 
actual or prospective use by the individual." Kolstad (2000, 296; emphasis K.) defines: "Existence value 
is the value a consumer attaches to knowing something exists. This would be in addition to any value 
associated with actual or potential 'use'." 
6
 In a seminal paper Bergstrom (1982) has shown that non-paternalistic altruism – the concern for 
others' well-being – is irrelevant for valuation. By contrast paternalistic altruism, when someone is 
concerned not with others' well-being but with other's consumption, does affect the valuation of a project 
(Jones-Lee 1992). See McConnell (1997) for an analysis of mixed cases of paternalistic and non-
paternalistic altruism, Ahlheim and Schneider (1996) for a comprehensive overview of concepts and 
Johansson (1993, 128-132) a concise treatment of altruism in cost-benefit analysis.  
7
 Cf. the references in footnote 3. 
8
 See Milgrom (1993, 419) for a similar argument. 
9
 For a recent survey of contingent valuation see Carson et al. (2001). 
10
 See, for example, the text books by Pearce and Turner (1990, 129-37), Hanley et al. (1997, 372-
76), Perman et al. (1999, 378-79), or Kolstad (2000, 296). 
11
 For the sake of simplicity of presentation the argument is restricted to positive values. An 
argument for negative values can be constructed in the same way. 
12
 I will not discuss Andreoni's (1990) concepts of pure and impure altruism. According to 
Andreoni pure altruism is a preference for a public good. With such a preference one would be willing to 
contribute to the good's provision and thereby benefit others. Impure altruism refers to an additional 
"warm glow" of giving. Andreoni's notion of pure altruism is a misnomer. The contribution to the public 
good stems entirely from selfish motivations, that is, one's own use of the good. Impure altruism also falls 
into the category of use values as the act of giving makes the donor better off. In addition impure altruism 
is selfish in the sense that the act of giving is relevant for the donor, not its consequences for the 
recipient. 
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13
 Q must be an entity that can benefit, i.e. it must make sense to say that Q is better off in one 
situation than in another. Otherwise Q-altruism is not a form of bequest value, but rather some form of 
existence value; see footnote 5. 
14
 See McConnell (1997) for a discussion of mixed cases. 
15
 Moreover, Milgrom's argument has been challenged by Ahlheim and Schneider (1996). 
16
 Note that vi satisfies IG. 
17
 See footnote 1 for a sample of references. 
18
 See Hanley and Spash (1993, 53 ff.) for a short overview and Carson et al. (2001) for a recent 
survey. 
